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Abstract 
This paper exploits a firm-level dataset for nineteen Sub-Sharan African countries that provides 
information on the share of total sales to government entities to provide new insights into the relative 
importance of participation in public procurement activity for different types of firms. We investigate 
whether participation in public procurement is associated with realization of the types of goals that 
underlie industrial policy – an improvement in measures of firm performance – and find that firms that 
sell a larger share of their output to government entities have better productivity performance. This is 
most strongly the case for domestically-owned firms, especially small companies, firms engaged in 
manufacturing activities and those located in the capital city. A positive relationship between 
participation in public procurement and performance is not observed for foreign-owned firms or 
companies that are in the service sector. 
Keywords 
Firm performance; productivity; government demand; public procurement; industrial policy; Sub-
Saharan Africa 
JEL Classification: H57; O12 
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1. Introduction* 
Governments around the world purchase a large variety of products from the private sector in order to 
provide public goods and services to citizens. Such public procurement often accounts for a significant 
share of GDP and thus aggregate demand. In low-income countries public procurement constitutes 
14.4 percent of GDP on average, with even larger values recorded in some of the poorest regions of 
the world, including South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Djankov et al., 2016; World Bank, 2016). 
Given the magnitude of government expenditures on goods and services, public procurement systems 
incorporate procedures that aim to ensure that contracts are awarded to the lowest cost suppliers that 
satisfy the technical specifications that need to be met. In most countries, if not all, value for money is 
not the only goal of public procurement systems. Governments also use procurement to pursue 
distributional, growth or industrial development goals (Geroski, 1990; Evenett and Hoekman, 2005; 
Kattel and Veiko, 2010). This may be reflected in quotas or price preferences for certain categories of 
domestic firms – e.g., minority-owned; small; located in disadvantaged regions; etc. – and more 
generally processes that earmark government funds for domestic firms (“buy national” policies).  
Public procurement has been a key tool in the industrial policy mix of many countries seeking to 
upgrade their industrial capabilities, encourage innovation and attain sustainable development goals – 
e.g., through so-called green procurement (OECD, 2013; Rodrik, 2015; UNIDO, 2017). There are 
good arguments why targeting procurement to create demand for new or innovative technologies may 
help complement supply side policies such as R&D subsidies. Geroski (1990) notes that government 
demand can stimulate innovation and allow firms to learn by doing. Price preference policies for 
domestic firms, local content or technology transfer requirements for foreign bidders may help foster 
innovation and learning, and more generally enhance the competitiveness of the domestic private 
sector (OECD, 2013; Ribiero and Furtado, 2014; Altenburg and Lütkenhorst, 2015; Dawar and Oh, 
2017). In addition, governments may use procurement as a macroeconomic tool – e.g., through 
stimulus packages to boost aggregate demand in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (Evenett 
and Shingal, 2016; Gourdon and Messent, 2017).  
There are long-standing debates on the utility and design of industrial policy (e.g., Page and Tarp, 
2017). These have tended to neglect the role of public procurement. There is only limited evidence on 
the extent to which public procurement is actually allocated with a view to achieving industrial 
development or competitiveness objectives and if so, whether it effectively contributes to the 
realization of such goals and the extent to which it improves firm-level productivity performance. 
Most research on the effects of public procurement centres on whether value for money is achieved 
and the effects of specific procurement procedures and mechanisms – e.g., publication of calls for 
tender; qualification of bidders; measures to prevent collusion and corruption.
1
 Moreover, most of the 
limited extant research is largely focussed on advanced economies; there is relatively little research on 
procurement in developing countries. In (large) part, the lack of research reflects the difficulties of 
accessing information on public procurement contracts and purchasing activities in low-income 
countries and a lack of disaggregated data on sales by firms that distinguish between different types of 
buyers.  
                                                     
*
 We are grateful to Richard Newfarmer and Ritwika Sen for helpful comments on an earlier draft. We thank UNIDO for 
granting access to the African Investor Survey data. Financial support for this research was provided by the International 
Growth Centre (Project N. 43421). 
1
 For example, Onur et al. (2012) analyse 90,000 government procurement tenders held in Turkey during 2004–06 and find 
that greater competition associated with open tendering procedures reduces average prices. Tenders that are open to 
foreign participation further reduce prices paid. 
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In this paper we use firm-level data from a survey covering roughly 6,700 companies based in 19 
Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries to investigate one dimension of the effect of public 
procurement. The survey includes information on the share of total sales to the Government. We use 
this to undertake an empirical assessment of the potential role that Government demand can have as a 
determinant of firm performance in the countries concerned. To the best of our knowledge this is the 
first effort to explore empirically the nexus between public procurement and firm performance in a 
cross-section of low-income countries. The case of SSA is particularly relevant for such an analysis 
given the presumption that one factor impeding structural transformation is weak demand (McMillan 
et al., 2014; Newman et al., 2016; UNIDO, 2017). In our sample of firms, a little over one-third report 
that low demand is a major cause of capacity underutilization. Government procurement can represent 
a meaningful source of demand, and the allocation of a government contract may encourage 
incumbent firms to invest more, expand employment and increase productivity (Geroski, 1990; 
Acemoglu et al., 2013; Ferraz et al., 2015). Such effects may not arise, however, as public 
procurement may have no impact or negative effects on the dynamism of the private sector if the 
allocation of contracts reflects political favouritism or corruption, targets the wrong type of firms or 
introduces other types of market distortions (Best et al., 2017).
2
 
The analysis relates to two strands of the research literature on public procurement and economic 
development. The first focuses on criteria for – and participation in – public procurement by different 
types of firms, motivated by the fact that many procurement regimes seek to steer domestic tax 
revenues to expenditures on local firms (as opposed to foreign companies), and often target specific 
types of domestic firms (e.g., SMEs). Questions of interest to this literature centre on the extent to 
which policy affects the allocation of procurement. Does policy result in increased participation by 
targeted entities and if so what types of measures are most effective?
3
 To what extent does policy 
explain the very strong “home bias” that is observed empirically in the allocation of procurement 
contracts – reflected in government expenditures being much less import-intensive than those of the 
private sector?
4
 From an economic welfare (efficiency) perspective the main issue of interest in this 
line of research generally concerns the opportunity costs of domestic preference policies from a value-
for-money perspective.
5
 In what follows we contribute to this strand of the literature by investigating 
the observed allocation of public procurement across firms in SSA countries, providing insight on the 
“revealed policy preference” implied by the pattern of procurement observed across different types of 
firms. 
A second related strand of the literature focuses on the (potential) role of public procurement as an 
instrument of industrial policy. Here the interest is not on the allocation of public procurement across 
firms (i.e. whether procurement procedures attain value for money goals), but whether government 
contracts enhance the performance of firms and the domestic economy more generally. The 
                                                     
2
 There is a substantial literature on public procurement in developing countries that looks at it through the lens of 
corruption and governance. See e.g., Auriol et al. (2016), Dube et al. (2017), Peireira and Schwind (2017) and Knack et 
al. (2017) for two recent contributions.  
3
 Knack et al (2017) use a large sample of firms from developing countries and demonstrate that participation in public 
procurement by smaller firms is positively affected by measures to increase the transparency of the process and effective 
domestic appeals and review/audit mechanisms. 
4
 E.g., Branco (1994), Trionfetti (2000), Shingal (2015), Ragoussis (2016). 
5
 The presumption is that transparent, competitive processes that are open to all firms, including foreign companies, will 
minimize procurement costs. However, depending on market structures and the relative size of government demand for a 
product, discriminatory procurement may have no effect on prices (Evenett and Hoekman, 2005) and may even reduce 
them (McAfee and McMillan, 1989). In a recent paper analysing the case of Russia’s procurement price preferences for 
domestic firms, Best et al. (2017) find that on average there is no effect on prices of the (homogenous) goods procured, 
but that there is also substantial heterogeneity that is explained by the “quality” of the officials responsible for procuring 
goods. 
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presumption is that public procurement can complement supply-side policies aimed at enhancing 
competitiveness of firms by generating additional demand for domestic firms and thus supporting their 
growth and overall productivity performance.
6
 For example, Hebous and Zimmerman (2016) 
investigate the nexus between public procurement and capital investment for a sample of US firms and 
show that sales to the government relaxes financial constraints, permitting firms to increase capital 
investment. Ferraz et al. (2015) exploit a large dataset on procurement bids in Brazil and show that 
winning a government contract increases overall employment growth of the firms concerned. They 
argue that learning processes help the firms to compete on new markets and to develop new products, 
with the government contracts acting as the trigger for such “downstream” effects. Lee (2017) obtains 
similar results using Korean procurement data: firms that obtain short term public procurement 
contracts (which are exogenous because Korean procurement rules call for a share of contracts to be 
allocated randomly) experience increased growth and activity generally, over and above the effects of 
the activity associated with the public contract. This is observed in particular for small, young and 
financially-constrained firms.
7
 
Our empirical analysis reveals that public procurement is a significant source of demand for many 
domestic firms in SSA. Government contracts account for a larger share of sales for domestic firms 
than foreign-owned ones, and are more important for larger and older firms. We find a strong positive 
relationship between government demand (selling to government entities) and the performance of 
firms in the low-income SSA countries covered by our dataset. Increasing the share of output sold to 
the government by 10 percentage points is associated with a 4 percentage point increase in 
productivity.
8
 There is substantial heterogeneity across firms, with the association between sales to the 
government and performance more evident for smaller and domestically-owned firms, as well as for 
firms that are at the bottom of the productivity distribution. Public procurement is positively related 
with other dimensions of firms’ performance as well, including the development of new products. The 
results are robust to different specifications, including accounting for potential selection bias and 
reverse causality. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and some 
descriptive statistics on our sample of countries. Section 3 describes the empirical analysis. Section 4 
presents the findings and the result of a number of robustness checks. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data 
We exploit a large representative survey – the African Investor Survey (AIS) – administered by 
UNIDO and covering about 6,700 firms based in 19 SSA countries (UNIDO, 2011).
9
 The data were 
collected using a rigorous survey methodology, including stratified sampling (with three dimensions: 
sector, size and ownership of firms) and interview techniques (face-to-face interviews with top-level 
managers). The sample is representative of public and private for profit firms with 10 or more 
employees.  
                                                     
6
 See Edler and Georghiou (2007) for a discussion of the role public procurement as a demand-side policy and Georghiou, 
Edler and Yeow (2014) for analysis of the design of procurement policy if governments desire to use procurement to 
promote innovation. 
7
 This econometric evidence complements the case study literature. See e.g., Ribeiro and Furtado (2014) for references to 
the literature and a case study of public procurement policy in Brazil to promote innovation (focusing on a Petrobras 
deep-water oil production platform contract). 
8
 As discussed further in what follows, we use different measures of firm-level productivity in the empirical analysis.  
9
 See http://investment.unido.org/imp/About/AboutOurData.aspx. The countries are: Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia. 
Bernard Hoekman and Marco Sanfilippo 
 
4 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
 
The richness of information provided by the AIS illustrates the heterogeneous dimensions of firms 
in the region. The sample includes both domestic (62.4% of the total) and foreign-owned firms (37.6% 
of the total). It covers mainly firms in the manufacturing and services sectors and provides detailed 
information on each company, including its 2-digit industry classification (based on the ISIC Rev. 3 
classification), location, international trade position, and the financial variables necessary to compute 
standard indicators of firm performance. Most relevant for our purposes is that the survey includes a 
question asking firms to identify their main customers and the share of total sales going to six possible 
client groups: (1) retailers; (2) wholesale distributors; (3) manufacturers; (4) consumers; (5) 
government agencies; and (6) international organizations/NGOs. Among the 4,600 firms (68% of total 
sample) that responded to this specific question, 29.6% reported at least some sales to the 
Government. This information is roughly comparable with the World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
(WBES). For the sample of 19 SSA countries surveyed by UNIDO and for a similar time period the 
WBES data indicate that 23.2% of firms report securing (or attempting to do so) government contracts 
during the last year. Despite the differences in sample definitions and specific questions included in 
the UNIDO AIS and the WBES,
10
 the information concerning participation in procurement correlates 
quite well (see Figure A1 in the Appendix).  
For the full sample of firms and countries, on average the government accounted for about 8.1% of 
firms’ total sales (Figure 1). More disaggregated descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 reveal a 
heterogeneous picture: firm- and industry-specific characteristics affect the extent to which 
government matters as a source of demand. Domestic firms sell – on average – larger shares of their 
output to the Government compared to foreign-owned firms. Among foreign-owned firms, those from 
OECD economies report a higher share of total sales to the state. Although Southern multinationals 
have been successfully investing and contracting in the SSA region (Zhang and Gutman, 2015), it 
appears that such firms are less focused on the local government procurement market. The data also 
indicate that larger firms sell on average a greater share of their output to the government, as do firms 
that have been in operation for more than 10 years. Family-owned businesses in contrast appear less 
likely to take advantage of government demand.  
The relative importance of government demand for firms varies across sectors. Not surprisingly, 
firms in the utilities and the construction sector report significantly higher shares of total output being 
sold to governments. Manufacturing firms sell proportionally less to government compared than firms 
in service sectors, this is especially true for traditional and lower tech type of activities. Producers of 
higher-tech products are likely to sell relatively less to Government.
11
 Large differences in the relative 
importance of sales to the government are also observed across countries. Figure 2 shows that for 
some countries the share of Government demand in total sales of local firms is much greater than it is 
for other countries in the sample. This is the case for Burundi, Niger, Ethiopia and Rwanda. Some of 
these countries (such as Rwanda) reportedly have made substantial improvements in the management 
of their public procurement systems, as assessed by the Public Expenditure and Financial 
Accountability (PEFA) indicators.
12
 Countries where firms on average report the lowest shares of 
output being sold to the government tend to have lower PEFA scores (see Appendix Table A1). 
                                                     
10
 The UNIDO AIS includes a larger share of foreign firms in its sample than the WBES. In addition, the AIS question on 
public procurement differs from that in the WBES. The WBES asks firms to report whether they secured or attempted to 
secure public procurement over the last year, with the main goal of determining if kick-backs or bribes were paid when 
seeking such contracts. The AIS asks about actual levels of current sales to government entities. The AIS does not 
provide information on when tenders were submitted by firms or contracts were awarded.  
11
 The mapping of manufacturing activities into technology categories uses a classification developed by OECD (2005). See 
UNIDO (2011, p. 62). 
12
 See https://pefa.org/. World Bank (2016) provides more detailed indicators characterizing the legal and institutional 
design of national procurement systems but these do not include any information on the objectives of procurement 
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Table 1. Government demand across firm characteristics and sector 
Firms' characteristics 
Share of sales to Gov. 
(% on total sales) Obs 
Domestic  9.40% 2804 
Foreign  6.04% 1785 
Foreign firms from North 7.54% 764 
Foreign firms from South 4.65% 711 
Foreign firms from other SSA 6.12% 205 
Family owned* 6.88% 3069 
Government owned 18.29% 186 
Small (<50) 7.61% 2058 
Medium (50-100) 8.03% 924 
Large (>100) 8.82% 1562 
Young firm** 6.68% 1445 
Old firm** 8.74% 3144 
Exporter 4.59% 1325 
non-Exporter 9.63% 2901 
Capital city 8.78% 1830 
Other cities 6.87% 2707 
Agric. & Mining 4.52% 334 
Manufacturing 6.32% 3124 
Electricity-Water-Construction 28.86% 313 
Services 8.38% 818 
Low-tech Manuf. 5.90% 1735 
Mid-tech Manuf. 6.00% 871 
Hi-tech Manuf. 8.25% 518 
Know-services 8.70% 523 
Mkt-services 8.53% 490 
Total number of firms  4600 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on AIS 
*Family holds more than 50.01% 
 **Younger/older than 10 years 
  
 
  
(Contd.)                                                                  
regimes, the extent to which there are preferences for certain types of bidders or the prevalence of kick-backs and other 
corrupt practices. 
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Figure 1. Average share of sales by main buyers 
 
Note: IIOO: International organization. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNIDO AIS data. 
 
Figure 2. Average share of sales to Gov. (as a % of total sales), by country 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNIDO AIS data. 
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3. Empirical Analysis 
Following the voluminous literature on heterogeneous firms (e.g., Helpman et al., 2004), our empirical 
model is based on the following general functional relationship linking firm performance to a vector of 
firm-specific factors and a measure of government demand:
13
  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑥 = ∑𝛽𝑍𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑖 + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝛿𝑥 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑥      (1) 
In this model, y is a performance indicator for firm i in country j and sector x. In our main estimates 
we use an indicator of labour productivity (lab_prod), constructed as the sales per employee, but we 
also use alternative performance indicators, including value added per worker, capital intensity, wages, 
and innovation. The variable Z is a vector of standard controls used in the literature to account for firm 
heterogeneity. More specifically, we add the age (age) and the size (size_class) of the firm, both 
expected to be positively correlated with productivity (Helpman et al., 2004), and whether a firm is 
family owned (family), which usually has a negative impact on firm performance. We account also for 
export status (exporter) and foreign ownership (foreign), both of which are generally significant 
predictors of superior performance, including in the African context (Foster-McGregor et al. 2014), 
and control for the skill intensity of workers in a firm (skill_ratio). In addition, we include a full set of 
country and industry fixed effects to account for all unobserved contextual factors that may influence 
the relationship between Government demand and firm performance. These include both cross-country 
differences in levels of development, institutions and regulation of the procurement process, as well as 
for the fact that some industries (such as construction, as shown in Table 1) may rely more on 
procurement markets and have different levels of technology intensity.  
The coefficient of interest, 𝛾, accounts for the share of firm i total sales to government entities. For 
our sample countries we expect this variable to be positively related with indicators of firm 
performance. Effective public procurement regimes that emphasize value for money mimic the market 
by generating competition between suppliers, the aim being that the most efficient firms win contracts. 
Insofar as this is the case, there should be no difference between firms that sell (more) to the 
government and those that sell to other customers (private buyers). However, this need not be so if 
public procurement is used as an instrument of industrial policy or if it is distorted by corruption or 
collusion between bidders. In low-income SSA economies, firms generally have low levels of 
productivity and are often growth constrained, reflecting poor business environments, limited access to 
credit and structural characteristics such as small size and limited international exposure (Clarke 2012; 
Iacovone et al. 2014). Public procurement may help offset such supply side constraints by increasing 
demand for firms’ output.  
Demand from the government can positively affect firm performance through different channels. 
First, to the extent that government demand is additional (acts as an exogenous increase in demand for 
the firm’s output), it may allow firms to relax some of the constraints they confront (e.g. access to 
finance), mobilizing resources to invest and enhance their performance (as in Habous and 
Zimmerman, 2016 and Lee, 2017). Second, as suggested by Ferraz et al. (2015), firms winning 
procurement bids may benefit from learning mechanisms, insofar as winning a procurement contract 
allows them to better understand the dynamics of demand for their products, potentially feeding into 
growth along the extensive margin (penetrate new markets; obtain new clients). Third, government 
demand may incentivize pursuit of more risky activities, such as development and introduction of new 
(differentiated) products and new investments in R&D (Edler and Georghiou, 2007; Aschhoff et al., 
                                                     
13
 A full description of the variables introduced in equation (1), together with descriptive statistics, is provided in Appendix 
Table A2. 
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2009; Slatchev and Wiederhold, 2016). Of course, these mechanisms may not apply equally to all 
types of firms and sectors – the relationship will be heterogeneous, depending on firm characteristics.  
While the literature suggests that government demand may be important for firms that are smaller 
and younger and/or have limited access to finance and high innovative potential (Acemoglu et al., 
2013; Ferraz et al, 2015; Habous and Zimmerman, 2016), the effect of public procurement 
(government demand) need not to be positive. In practice, the design of procurement policy and its 
implementation will matter. If procurement reflects a process of generating and sharing rents between 
“connected” firms and government officials, positive performance effects either may not be observed 
or be smaller than they would otherwise be.  
A preliminary look at our data suggests there is a positive procurement/performance nexus in low-
income SSA countries. Figure 3 reports the kernel distribution of the estimated coefficient for labour 
productivity, distinguishing between firms that sell to the government (independently of the share of 
total output being sold) and firms that do not. The graph shows that the distribution of the former 
group tends to dominate the latter, reflected in a rightward shift. In addition, Figure 4 reports the 
relationship between productivity and the size of government demand, suggesting a weak positive 
association. 
Figure 3. Kernel distribution of productivity 
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Figure 4. Productivity and sales to Government 
 
4. Results 
Table 2 reports the results of estimating equation (1) using OLS. The model generally performs well, 
and all the major controls included have the expected sign. As indicated in Column 1, we replicate the 
well-known existing empirical evidence on performance of heterogeneous firms: larger and older 
firms are significantly more productive, as are those employing a greater number of skilled workers. 
Higher levels of productivity are observed also among firms that export and those that are foreign 
owned. On the other hand, we find that family-owned firms are less productive compared to others.  
Moving to our variable of interest (Table 2, column 1), we find that the share of sales to 
government is positively associated with firm performance. The estimate is statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level, demonstrating a strong correlation between government demand and firm 
performance. The size of the coefficient is not only statistically, but also economically significant. 
Increasing the share of output sold to the government by 10 percentage points is associated with an 
increase in the level of productivity of about 4 percentage points.  
While selling to the government may help firms improve productivity performance, dependence on 
the state also may represent an obstacle to firm growth if firms lack alternative markets. For this 
reason, in column (2) we test the hypothesis that the relationship between government demand and 
firm performance may be non-linear. We find indeed that the squared coefficient of labour 
productivity turns negative (and is statistically significant) as the share of total output sold to the state 
rises, with a turning point reached when two-thirds of total sales are to the government. To complete 
this first set of results, in column (3) we replace our variable of interest with a dummy taking the value 
of 1 if firms sell to the government and 0 otherwise. The coefficient estimate is again positive and 
significant, indicating there is on average a 20 percent difference in productivity levels between the 
two groups of firms. Finally, in column (4) we explore whether government demand is a specific 
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mechanism that enhances firm performance as opposed to demand by non-commercial entities more 
generally. We replace our coefficient of interest with the share of output sold by each firm to 
international organizations and non-profit organizations (NGOs). These types of buyers are more 
likely to have as overriding objective maximizing value for money. The coefficient for this variable is 
positive but not statistically significant, providing suggestive evidence that government procurement 
may be acting as an industrial policy tool.  
Table 2. Main results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Main Squared_term Main_dummy int. procurement 
     
size_class 0.241*** 0.242*** 0.240*** 0.246*** 
 (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0290) 
age 0.175*** 0.172*** 0.171*** 0.182*** 
 (0.0304) (0.0304) (0.0304) (0.0301) 
exporter 0.328*** 0.326*** 0.324*** 0.318*** 
 (0.0558) (0.0558) (0.0558) (0.0560) 
foreign 0.455*** 0.456*** 0.457*** 0.447*** 
 (0.0529) (0.0528) (0.0528) (0.0527) 
family -0.265*** -0.264*** -0.265*** -0.270*** 
 (0.0559) (0.0559) (0.0557) (0.0559) 
skill_ratio 1.152*** 1.145*** 1.146*** 1.179*** 
 (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) 
share_gov 0.400*** 0.930***   
 (0.129) (0.309)   
Proc_dumy   0.202***  
   (0.0488)  
share_gov^2  -0.708*   
  (0.388)   
Share_iioo    0.210 
    (0.172) 
     
Observations 4,103 4,103 4,103 4,101 
R-squared 0.325 0.325 0.326 0.323 
Country Effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry Effects Y Y Y Y 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
4.1 Results: firm heterogeneity and other mechanisms  
We next investigate whether the positive relationship between procurement (sales to the government) 
and productivity varies across different sub-samples of firms and is affected by specific characteristics, 
location or sector of activity. In columns (1)-(2) of Table 3 we split the sample between domestic and 
foreign-owned firms. The coefficient estimate on the share of output sold to the government is 
statistically significant only for the former group. In columns (3)-(4) we differentiate between SMEs 
(firms with fewer than 100 employees) and large companies, the positive correlation appears only for 
the group spanning the smaller firms. If we further disaggregate the group of SMEs into firms with 
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less than 50 employees and “micro” enterprises14 with fewer than 20 employees, the size of the 
coefficient increases for smaller firms, confirming that public procurement has proportionally higher 
potential on smaller, demand constrained, firms (see Figure 5). The lack of statistical significance of 
the estimates for larger and foreign-owned firms could be due to these firms having higher levels of 
productivity, which might not be impacted by selling to the government. However, taken together, 
these results suggest that additional demand stemming from government contracts may positively 
affect the performance of the set of firms that are most likely to be growth constrained, i.e. 
domestically-owned firms and SMEs.  
Figure 5. Coefficient share_gov by size of firms 
 
Notes: The figure plots coefficients and their confidence intervals based on separate regressions run on samples 
including (1) micro firms (with less than 20 employees); (2) small firms (less than 50); (3) SMEs (less than 100); 
(4) the whole sample.  
Results in columns (5)-(6) of Table 3 show that the positive association between government demand 
and performance is mostly concentrated among firms in the manufacturing sector (excluding 
construction). There is no statistically significant effect for firms in services sectors. Finally, if we split 
the sample into firms located in the capital city and those based elsewhere (Columns 7-8), we find 
evidence that location matters. In the remaining columns of Table 3 we interact our variable of interest 
with country specific variables. First, we control for the level of corruption prevailing in each country. 
The procurement literature notes that weak public sector governance can discourage competitive firms 
from participating in procurement processes, reflecting expectations that bids will not be awarded on 
the basis of published requirements (Evenett and Hoekman, 2005; Best et al., 2017; Knack et al., 
2017). One potential consequence is to reduce any effect of government demand on productivity as 
winning contracts will be determined in part by the ability and willingness to provide side-payments. 
                                                     
14
 We are unable to identify micro enterprises on the basis of the usual threshold used in the literature (<10 employees) 
because the AIS data cover a representative sample of registered firms that employ more than ten workers (UNIDO, 
2011: 183).  
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Table 3: Firm Heterogeneity and Additional Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES Domestic Foreign SMEs Large Manuf. Services Capital_city Othr city Corruption Tariffs Targeting 
size_class 0.330*** 0.0933* 0.145**  0.256*** 0.175** 0.201*** 0.253*** 0.241*** 0.249*** 0.306*** 
 (0.0360) (0.0496) (0.0633)  (0.0333) (0.0766) (0.0368) (0.0532) (0.0289) (0.0347) (0.0408) 
age 0.104*** 0.250*** 0.113*** 0.222*** 0.161*** 0.212*** 0.204*** 0.160*** 0.175*** 0.153*** 0.159*** 
 (0.0371) (0.0546) (0.0378) (0.0533) (0.0357) (0.0767) (0.0392) (0.0568) (0.0304) (0.0369) (0.0417) 
exporter 0.327*** 0.378*** 0.404*** 0.257*** 0.354*** 0.423** 0.307*** 0.354*** 0.328*** 0.292*** 0.214*** 
 (0.0747) (0.0863) (0.0747) (0.0867) (0.0616) (0.167) (0.0693) (0.104) (0.0558) (0.0642) (0.0731) 
foreign   0.553*** 0.360*** 0.506*** 0.679*** 0.531*** 0.387*** 0.455*** 0.469*** 0.487*** 
   (0.0677) (0.0890) (0.0625) (0.136) (0.0647) (0.107) (0.0528) (0.0653) (0.0744) 
family -0.228***  -0.308*** 0.0977 -0.199*** -0.162 -0.177** -0.327*** -0.265*** -0.284*** -0.218*** 
 (0.0575)  (0.0652) (0.112) (0.0638) (0.139) (0.0735) (0.0953) (0.0559) (0.0674) (0.0803) 
skill_ratio 0.766*** 1.768*** 0.856*** 1.599*** 1.283*** 0.497* 0.960*** 1.244*** 1.152*** 1.352*** 1.405*** 
 (0.172) (0.253) (0.182) (0.245) (0.196) (0.282) (0.178) (0.288) (0.145) (0.201) (0.251) 
share_gov 0.375** 0.446 0.437*** 0.329 0.480*** 0.300 0.439*** 0.489* 0.403* 0.158 0.203 
 (0.148) (0.287) (0.154) (0.230) (0.164) (0.311) (0.155) (0.265) (0.213) (0.209) (0.199) 
share_gov*corruption         0.00511   
         (0.269)   
share_gov*tarfiff          0.0103**  
          (0.00463)  
share_gov*targeting           1.270*** 
           (0.416) 
Observations 2,485 1,612 2,676 1,424 2,817 720 2,415 1,402 4,103 2,787 1,799 
R-squared 0.328 0.282 0.335 0.315 0.342 0.294 0.341 0.321 0.325 0.314 0.373 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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We find that the interaction term is not statistically significant, suggesting that higher levels of 
overall corruption do not affect the mechanisms through which procurement relates to performance.
15
 
Second, we interact the government demand variable with average import tariffs for the products 
being procured and an indicator measuring whether sectors have been targeted by national investment 
promotion activities (both indicators exclude services).
16
 These variables can be regarded as rough 
indicators of industrial policy. The results indicate that the performance-procurement relationship is 
bolstered in the presence of complementary sectoral policies. 
4.2 Additional results  
In this sub-section, we implement additional empirical tests to assess the robustness of our results to 
(a) different definitions of the dependent variable; and (b) alternative empirical strategies. Table 4 
reports the results of our main specification using alternative indicators of firm-level performance, 
including value added per worker
17
 (leading to a reduction in the number of observations) and a 
measure of total factor productivity (TFP).
18
 Columns (1)-(2) reveal that results do not change much; 
the signs and magnitudes of the estimates are very similar to our main results. 
The same result obtains for alternative indicators of performance, including the capital labour ratio, 
the level of wages per worker and two measures of innovation, the introduction of new products and 
implementing process innovations. Firms that sell a greater share of their output to the government are 
more likely to introduce new products as opposed to engage in process innovation. This result is 
consistent with findings in the extant literature showing a nexus between public procurement and the 
development of innovative capacities by firms in OECD economies (Ashhoff and Sofka, 2009; 
Slavtchev and Wiederhold, 2016; Czarnitzki et al., 2016). To the best of our knowledge there is no 
evidence regarding government demand as a driver of innovation processes in low-income economies 
in general, and in SSA countries in particular. As noted previously, the literature highlights several 
channels through which government demand can incentivize innovation and help to offset supply-side 
constraints, including by creating new markets for products, providing a testing ground for innovative 
products and learning by doing (Kattel and Lember, 2010). While data limitations prevent us from 
investigating the salience of such mechanisms in SSA, it is noteworthy that we observe this 
relationship in our sample countries.  
                                                     
15
 The lack of statistical significance obtains as well if alternative indicators of institutional quality are used, such as the rule 
of law or the political stability index.  
16
 Sector targeting is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the industry has been targeted prior to 2003 for specific 
promotion towards foreign investors (Harding and Javorcik, 2012). For the purposes of this paper, it can either be 
intended as a measure related to industrial policy, aimed at increasing the competitiveness of the industry, or as a measure 
of competition, due to the likely large presence of foreign investors. 
17
 Value added is measured by subtracting the value of purchased inputs and the costs of advertising to the output to total 
sales. 
18
 TFP is constructed by dividing sales on the weighted sum of inputs, assuming a 2/3 share for labour and 1/3 for capital 
(fixed assets).  
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Table 4. Results using alternative indicators of firm performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES VA_EMP TFP K/L WAGES PRODUCT_INNO PROCESS_INNO 
       
size_class 0.206*** 0.184*** 0.160*** 0.113*** 0.0789* 0.139*** 
 (0.0343) (0.0275) (0.0374) (0.0243) (0.0430) (0.0418) 
age 0.153*** 0.140*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.0382 0.0282 
 (0.0349) (0.0283) (0.0398) (0.0248) (0.0450) (0.0441) 
exporter 0.218*** 0.250*** 0.315*** 0.118** 0.406***  
 (0.0672) (0.0537) (0.0685) (0.0465) (0.0807)  
foreign 0.480*** 0.356*** 0.229*** 0.355***   
 (0.0620) (0.0504) (0.0638) (0.0437)   
family -0.321*** -0.172*** -0.383*** -0.174*** 0.0260 -0.0510 
 (0.0663) (0.0517) (0.0753) (0.0479) (0.0674) (0.0682) 
skill_ratio 1.003*** 0.991*** 0.419* 0.872*** 0.00976 -0.0714 
 (0.173) (0.146) (0.215) (0.128) (0.231) (0.228) 
share_gov 0.391*** 0.315** 0.337** 0.252*** 0.344** 0.0798 
 (0.145) (0.125) (0.149) (0.0926) (0.173) (0.176) 
Constant     -2.326*** -1.398*** 
     (0.420) (0.338) 
       
Observations 3,606 4,021 4,051 3,910 1,954 2,111 
R-squared 0.347 0.275 0.197 0.265   
Country 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry 
Effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Results of columns (5)-(6) are based on a standard Probit estimator. Information on (product and process innovation) is only available for the sub-sample of 
domestic firms. 
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Finally, we estimate our main model using a quantile regression approach to better account for 
heterogeneity in the distribution of firm performance by measuring the relationship with government 
demand at different points of the conditional productivity distribution (i.e. distinguishing more 
precisely whether the correlation is stronger/weaker than the average for less/more productive firms). 
In addition to extending our main results, a quantile regression approach also improves on OLS due to 
its capacity to accommodate outliers and greater robustness to heteroscedasticity. Following Foster-
McGregor et al (2014), who adopt a similar approach (and use the same AIS data as we do), we 
employ a method developed by Canay (2011) that accounts for the potential incidental parameters 
problem from the inclusion of a large number of fixed effects (in our case at the country and industry 
level). The approach consists of first estimating the fixed effects (𝜃?̂?; 𝛿𝑥) from the standard conditional 
model using OLS and then, assuming they are constant across quantiles, defining a new dependent 
variable given by:  
 
?̂?𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝜃?̂? − 𝛿𝑥 
We then use this dependent variable to estimate a simultaneous quantile regression model with 
bootstrapped standard errors. Results of the quantile regression for our variable of interest are 
summarized in Figure 6; the full set of results is reported in Appendix Table A3. The overall size of 
the coefficient of interest is close to the one estimated with OLS, but Figure 6 shows a slightly 
decreasing trend in the size of the coefficient along the quantiles of the productivity distribution. This 
reveals that the incidence of government demand is stronger for firms with lower levels of 
productivity, which appears consistent with our results regarding the significant correlations between 
public procurement participation and performance of domestic firms and SMEs. Both are more likely 
to be at the bottom of the productivity ladder in SSA.  
 
Figure 6. Coefficient share_gov across quantiles 
 
 
Note: The figure plots coefficients of the quantile regression outputs reported in Appendix Table A3. 
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4.3 Robustness Checks and Endogeneity  
The cross-section nature of our data precludes any claims or inference of a causal relationship between 
the intensity of public procurement participation and firm performance. Our results may be affected by 
endogeneity as a result of possible self-selection of better performing firms into government 
procurement, or government entities selecting more productive firms when undertaking procurement. 
Recent papers that have estimated the effects of procurement on different dimensions of firm 
performance are able to address such potential endogeneity issues by having panel data that permit 
conditioning on the characteristics of the firms before winning procurement bids, and exploiting a 
quasi-experimental setting as a result of specific features of the procurement process analysed (Ferraz 
et al., 2015; Hebous and Zimmerman, 2016; Lee, 2017). 
The cross-sectional nature of our data impede the use of standard approaches to address 
endogeneity in a robust manner. Instead, we try to address the selection issue by constructing a control 
group of firms that display as much as possible the same characteristics as firms receiving the 
treatment (selling to the government). A basic limitation here is that we do not have information on the 
exact time firms began to sell to the government. Nonetheless, this approach is frequently used in 
cross-sectional studies to disentangle potential bias arising from the heterogeneity of the firms in our 
sample.
19
 We implement a matching methodology by selecting among the 3,268 firms that do not sell 
to the Government a control group based on characteristics that help predicting selection into 
procurement. The latter are found by running a probit model in which the probability of finding firms 
with positive shares of sales to the government depends on the same factors that we include in our 
OLS model (size, ownership, skills) plus the inclusion of the level of productivity observed in the two 
years preceding the survey. Pairs of country-industry fixed effects are added to constrain control group 
firms to be in the same country/industry as the treated firms (those that sell to the government).  
Results of the selection model are reported in Appendix Table A4. On the basis of the selection 
model we then construct inverse probability weights (IPW) that we use in our main regressions to 
provide a better comparison between controls and treated firms. To assess the results of the matching 
procedure just described, Figure A2 plots the distribution of the IPW of the two groups before and 
after weighting, showing that these are almost overlapping in the latter case. Results of the weighted 
regression are reported in the first column of Table A4. Coefficient estimates remain very similar. 
That for the share of procurement has a magnitude only slightly smaller than the baseline (0.36 instead 
of 0.4).
20
  
Second, we try to address potential endogeneity concerns by adopting an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach that exploits the cross-country variation in the data. We construct an instrument from the 
IMF Government Finance Statistics, using the average ratio of total Government spending to GDP for 
each country in our sample over the last decade (see Appendix Figure A3). Higher ratios of 
government spending to GDP should be positively associated with greater spending on goods and 
services (public procurement), and therefore the probability of firms securing procurement contracts, 
as well as the magnitude of their sales to government entities. While overall spending is not 
necessarily correlated with individual firm performance – it is much broader in scope – since this 
indicator is country variant, it will be absorbed by country fixed effects in the first stage. For each 
                                                     
19
 For example, in an empirical setting that is very similar to ours, Czarnitzki et al. (2016) apply matching methods to 
construct a control sample of firms not receiving procurement to evaluate the effects of procurement on innovation for a 
cross section of German firms. 
20
 As an additional test, we have also used a standard matching estimator based on the Leuven and Sianesi (2003) 
algorithm, comparing directly how differences in firms’ productivity are affected by the simple treatment (a dummy 
indicating if firms sell to the Government, without accounting for the shares). Results remain consistently similar to those 
reported in column (2) of Table 2, with an average treatment effect on the treated firms of about 0.2 when using the 
nearest neighbour estimator with common support. 
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country-industry pair we compute a variable measuring the share of firms selling to the Government 
on the total, as a proxy for the probability of each firm to be exposed to procurement.
21
 Our instrument 
is given by the combination of these two variables.  
Results, reported in the second column of Table A4, show that the instrument is relevant in the first 
stage, and that in the second stage the positive relationship between government demand and firm 
productivity is confirmed, with a coefficient that is similar in magnitude to our baseline model. We 
also test our IV strategy using two variables measuring access to procurement: (i) the PEFA indicator 
that assesses the performance (quality) of the national public procurement system; and (ii) the share of 
procurement-related bribes and payments reported by firms in the WBES (Knack et al. 2017). In both 
cases the IV estimation generates results that are consistent with our baseline findings.  
5. Conclusion 
Most public procurement systems aim to achieve “value for money” and much the research and policy 
literature on procurement focuses on this dimension of procurement. Less attention has been given to 
the prevalence and effectiveness of public procurement as a tool to support (enhance) the performance 
of domestic firms. In practice procurement tends to be characterized by a strong ‘home bias’ – most 
contracts are awarded to national, and often local, companies. This is as true in high-income countries 
as it is in lower-income countries. Indeed, for the latter the share of total procurement that is allocated 
to foreign firms (including imports) is often higher than in high-income nations as a result of limited 
industrial capacity and aid dependence (Evenett and Hoekman, 2013). There are many reasons why 
procuring entities may prefer to spend tax revenues at home, including efficiency rationales: it may 
minimize costs and ensure greater control and accountability for performance (Breton and Salmon, 
1995).  
In this paper we do not aim to assess to what extent procurement policies are designed to favour 
local sourcing and what the effects of extant policies are.
22
 Instead our goal is much less ambitious: we 
exploit a new source of firm-level data for SSA countries that provides information on the extent to 
which different types of firms sell their output to government entities. This provides new insights into 
how overall procurement activity across SSA countries is allocated, and whether participation in 
public procurement is associated with realization of the types of goals that underlie industrial policy – 
an improvement in measures of firm performance.  
We find that the allocation of public procurement is associated with higher levels of productivity of 
the firms that sell more of their output to government entities. This is most strongly the case – both in 
terms of statistical significance and economic magnitude of the relationship – for domestically-owned 
firms, especially SMEs, companies engaged in manufacturing activities and those located in the 
capital city. A positive relationship between procurement and performance is not observed for foreign-
owned firms or companies that are in the service sector. The results are suggestive that – whatever the 
underlying policy objectives that may guide the allocation of government contracts – public 
                                                     
21
 Since we cannot exploit pre-sample information on the distribution of firms selling to the government across sectors and 
countries, this variable is contemporaneous to our variable of interest. This clearly raises the risk of lack of validity of our 
instrument, violating the exclusion restriction. Especially when the number of observations at the country-industry pair is 
small, this reduces granularity of information and it is likely to identify a few firms and likely to correlate with the 
dependent variable as well. In additional analyses we have also constructed this measure at the industry level, i.e. by 
pooling countries. Results remain unaffected. 
22
 In part this is because we lack good information on the intent of procurement regimes and have no information on the 
overall allocation of the value of government procurement for the SSA countries in the sample. Extant efforts to 
characterize procurement systems – such as World Bank (2016) – do not document the policy objectives underlying 
procurement regulations. 
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procurement activity in the SSA countries in our sample is associated with outcomes that generally 
motivate industrial development policies.  
Our findings raise many questions and suggest a number of areas for further research. One question 
concerns the role of foreign-owned companies in procurement. The fact that we do not observe a 
relationship between sales to the government and indicators of firm performance is not surprising 
given the presumption that foreign-owned firms tend to have higher productivity. The interesting 
question here concerns how much foreign firms engage in bidding for procurement contacts. FDI is 
often mentioned as an avenue through which foreign firms can contest procurement markets insofar as 
having local presence is a necessary condition to sell to governments. This need not have anything to 
do with policy – in the case of services in particular the nature of the activities may simply require a 
local presence (Evenett and Hoekman, 2005). Better understanding the nexus between foreign 
investment and the allocation of procurement contracts for goods and services across firms in SSA. 
Another interesting question concerns our finding that the effects of procurement may depend on 
complementary policies that go beyond directly targeting supply-side constraints. The large positive 
and significant coefficient estimate for the interaction between the share of total sales to the 
government and the prevalence of inward investment promotion activities in the relevant sectors 
suggests such complementarities may be important. This is a subject where further research may be 
fruitful from a policy perspective. Kutlina-Dimitrova and Lakatos (2016), for example, use very 
detailed panel data on EU procurement and among other things find that trade and FDI policies as well 
as the quality of ‘behind-the-border’ product market regulation has an impact on the allocation of 
procurement.  
Unfortunately, these and other questions all require additional data on overall procurement activity 
at the national level and its allocation by sector and type of firm. Such data are not available for SSA 
countries. The suggestive results obtained here will hopefully help to stimulate efforts by governments 
to generate such data. What is needed first and foremost is to extend the time dimension of firm-level 
data on participation in public procurement.  
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APPENDIX  
Table A1. Public expenditure & financial accountability score (available SSA sample countries) 
Country Period  Overall (i) Transparency, 
comprehensiveness 
and competition in 
legal & regulatory 
framework 
(ii) Use of 
competitive 
procurement 
methods 
(iii) Public access to 
complete, reliable 
and timely 
procurement 
information 
(iv) Existence of 
an independent 
procurement 
complaints system 
Burkina Faso Apr. 07 C+ D C A NU 
Burkina Faso Jun. 10 B C B A NU 
Burkina Faso Jun. 14 B+ B A B B 
Burundi Feb. 09 D+ D C C NU 
Burundi Mar. 12 C+ B D D A 
Cape Verde Dec. 08 B B B C NU 
Cape Verde May 16 C+ B D D A 
Ethiopia Oct. 07 C+ D B B NU 
Ethiopia Sep. 10 C+ D B B NU 
Ethiopia Apr.15 C+ B D C B 
Ghana Jun. 06 NR C NR NR NU 
Ghana Jan. 10 B+ A B B NU 
Ghana Jun. 13 C B D D B 
Kenya Jul. 06 B C B A NU 
Kenya Mar. 09 B C B A NU 
Kenya Aug. 12 C+ B D B B 
Lesotho Jun. 07 NU NU NU NU NU 
Lesotho Nov. 12 D+ B D D D 
Madagascar May 06 C C C C NU 
Madagascar May 08 C D B C C 
Madagascar Aug. 14 D+ B D D D 
Malawi Jun. 08 NR NR C C NU 
Malawi Mar. 11 C B D D B 
Mali Dec. 08 C B D C NU 
Mali Jun. 11 C B D C NU 
Mali Oct.16 B+ B B B A 
Mozambique Mar. 06 C C C C NU 
Mozambique Feb. 08 B B C B NU 
Mozambique Mar. 11 B B C B NU 
Mozambique Dec.15 D+ B D D D 
Niger Dec. 08 B B B B NU 
Niger Mar. 13 B+ A B B A 
Rwanda Jun. 08 B A C B NU 
Rwanda Nov. 10 A A A A NU 
Senegal Jun. 11 B+ B A B A 
Tanzania Jun. 06 C+ NU NU NU NU 
Tanzania Nov. 10 B B B B NU 
Tanzania Sep. 13 NR B NR NR D 
Uganda Mar. 08 C D C B NU 
Uganda Jun. 09 D+ NR D C NU 
Uganda Sep. 12 D+ B D C D 
Zambia Dec. 05  D+ D C C NU 
Zambia Jun. 13 D+ B D D D 
Source: https://pefa.org/.  
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Table A2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable name Description Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
lab_prod Sales on employees (log) 6398 10.04 1.67 1.54 16.59 
va_emp Value added on employees (log) 5666 9.47 1.82 -0.11 16.58 
tfp Total Factor Productivity (log) 6207 7.00 1.49 -0.64 15.76 
kl Capital labour ratio (log) 6369 9.11 1.99 0 18.21 
wage Wage per capita (log) 6097 7.91 1.32 -4.66 15.88 
product_inno Dummy, 1 if product innovation 2280 0.32 0.47 0 1 
process_inno Dummy, 1 if process innovation 2272 0.22 0.41 0 1 
       
size_class 1 if small, 2 if medium, 3 if large 6618 1.85 0.89 1 3 
lage Age of the firm (log) 6641 2.62 0.81 0 5.09 
exporter Dummy, 1 if exporting 5978 0.25 0.44 0 1 
foreign Dummy, 1 if foreign owned 6719 0.38 0.48 0 1 
family Dumy, 1 if family owned 6719 0.25 0.43 0 1 
skill_ratio Ratio of skilled on unskilled 6437 0.23 0.21 0 1 
share_gov Share of Sales to Government (% of total) 4589 0.08 0.19 0 1 
       
control corr Control of Corruption 6719 -0.54 0.50 -1.11 0.80 
tariffs Weighted tariffs 3306 25.32 29.56 0 200 
sector_targeting Sector Targeting 1994 0.24 0.43 0 1 
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Table A3. Quantile regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES q10 q20 q30 q40 q50 q60 q70 q80 q90 
          
size_class 0.216*** 0.244*** 0.281*** 0.263*** 0.265*** 0.266*** 0.240*** 0.228*** 0.261*** 
 (0.0520) (0.0312) (0.0278) (0.0320) (0.0215) (0.0260) (0.0240) (0.0326) (0.0426) 
age 0.296*** 0.250*** 0.251*** 0.219*** 0.180*** 0.142*** 0.122*** 0.0897*** 0.00127 
 (0.0517) (0.0355) (0.0311) (0.0300) (0.0320) (0.0334) (0.0352) (0.0314) (0.0552) 
exporter 0.296** 0.234*** 0.179** 0.218*** 0.265*** 0.316*** 0.405*** 0.450*** 0.480*** 
 (0.121) (0.0832) (0.0812) (0.0695) (0.0639) (0.0594) (0.0730) (0.0813) (0.0776) 
foreign 0.298*** 0.448*** 0.451*** 0.434*** 0.465*** 0.391*** 0.452*** 0.469*** 0.555*** 
 (0.103) (0.0728) (0.0729) (0.0715) (0.0627) (0.0631) (0.0802) (0.0860) (0.0944) 
family -0.403*** -0.276*** -0.238*** -0.208*** -0.212*** -0.278*** -0.252*** -0.242*** -0.196** 
 (0.0922) (0.0762) (0.0689) (0.0666) (0.0604) (0.0551) (0.0663) (0.0576) (0.0902) 
skill_ratio 1.089*** 1.071*** 1.096*** 1.007*** 0.959*** 0.995*** 1.136*** 0.980*** 1.126*** 
 (0.308) (0.171) (0.152) (0.162) (0.158) (0.150) (0.179) (0.180) (0.353) 
share_gov 0.536** 0.446*** 0.236** 0.254* 0.373*** 0.262** 0.317*** 0.375*** 0.406*** 
 (0.262) (0.129) (0.114) (0.145) (0.122) (0.117) (0.107) (0.128) (0.147) 
Constant 6.957*** 7.580*** 7.914*** 8.336*** 8.700*** 9.098*** 9.419*** 9.895*** 10.58*** 
 (0.180) (0.146) (0.0914) (0.0952) (0.105) (0.120) (0.122) (0.108) (0.173) 
          
Observations 4,103 4,103 4,103 4,103 4,103 4,103 4,103 4,103 4,103 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4. Selection model 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Dep. Var: 
Proc. Dummy 
  
lab_prod (2yrs lag) 0.0388** 
 (0.0188) 
size_class 0.113*** 
 (0.0370) 
age 0.228*** 
 (0.0384) 
exporter 0.0271 
 (0.0699) 
foreign -0.188*** 
 (0.0669) 
family -0.0944 
 (0.0694) 
skill_ratio 0.523*** 
 (0.186) 
Constant -5.867*** 
 (0.314) 
  
Observations 3,145 
Country-Industry Effects Y 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A5. Robustness & endogeneity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Weighted IV Expend/GDP IV PEFA/GDP IV Bribe/GDP 
     
size_class 0.250*** 0.243*** 0.241*** 0.242*** 
 (0.0416) (0.0288) (0.0289) (0.0289) 
age 0.116*** 0.174*** 0.170*** 0.172*** 
 (0.0402) (0.0304) (0.0305) (0.0304) 
exporter 0.304*** 0.316*** 0.321*** 0.318*** 
 (0.0781) (0.0556) (0.0555) (0.0556) 
foreign 0.429*** 0.451*** 0.455*** 0.453*** 
 (0.0746) (0.0527) (0.0526) (0.0528) 
family -0.153** -0.272*** -0.269*** -0.271*** 
 (0.0772) (0.0556) (0.0556) (0.0557) 
skill_ratio 1.184*** 1.158*** 1.143*** 1.152*** 
 (0.237) (0.145) (0.145) (0.146) 
share_gov 0.360** 0.429** 0.652*** 0.519* 
 (0.157) (0.217) (0.219) (0.277) 
     
Observations 3,355 4,104 4,104 4,104 
R-squared 0.279 0.121 0.120 0.121 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Figure A1. Share of firms in procurement, comparison between AIS and WBES data 
  
Source: Authors’ elaboration on UNIDO AIS and World Bank WBES 
 
 
Figure A2. Distribution of IPW before (left panel) and after (right panel) weighting 
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Figure A3. Government expenditures as a share of GDP (average 2006-2016) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF Government Finance Statistics. 
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